An Analysis of Civil Procedures Game Theory with Emphasis on Cooperative Procedures Game

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Azad University, Karaj Branch

2 MA in Economic Law, Allameh Tabatabaei University

Abstract

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics in which practical
solution in strategies of each reactor has direct impact on other reactors
decisions. Therefore, there is an interior dependence between reactors
that have an influence on the result of the game. Game theory is actually
meant to analyze players profit based on the game theory. The civil
procedures game theory is to analyze the civil gamers' behavior.
However, interchangeable factors such as either party's expectations
from judicial system, their incomplete information, incompetent trial
regularity as long as illogical motivations can misdirect the procedures
of "choice of strategy" and lead to unwanted and unpleasant trial results.
Civil games can be cooperative and uncooperative. In an uncooperative
civil game theory each reactor's choice of strategy will be conservative
which leads the result to be no predictable or "win-lose". On the
contrary, through a cooperative civil game theory each gamer is aware of
other gamer's procedures. Their information will be partly shared, so the
results wil be predictable and "win-win." This article , focuses on the
concept and the basis of the game theory and the effective factors on the
game and types of civil procedure games along with a focus on
cooperative game procedure.

Keywords


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