The impact of the insurance on the deterrence of tort law

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Professor, Farabi Campus of the University of Tehran

2 PhD Student, Farabi Campus of the University of Tehran

Abstract

Deterrence is one of the main functions of tort law. Presence of
insurance weakened that function and raised carelessness because the
compensation by insurer not only does not deter injurer, but also may
encourage him/her or others to carelessness. This impact of insurance is
named ''moral hazard''. Although insurers have some instruments to
reduce moral hazard, but for competition reasons, insurers use them less,
but if the management would be true, moral hazard will be reduced, and
as a result, the deterrence of tort law will be reinforced. Iranian Act of
Compulsory Insurance for Loss of Third Party in Traffic Accident of
Vehicles 2016 provided some instruments for reduction of moral hazard
that includes maintaining of liability of negligent driver with insurance
coverage, to consider insurer as a successor of negligent driver and
determining premiums on the basis of experience rating. That
instruments increase efficiency of tort law and if would be enforced
truly, will lead to reduction in traffic accidents Rules of tort law impacts
on its deterrence and incentives of buying policy by risk averse actors
and accepting particular theory may led to reduction of deterrence and
reduction or increase of welfare. For instance, acceptance of negligence
rule and encouraging of injurer to buy policy will lead to increase of
welfare and keep deterrence of tort law.


Keywords

References

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