Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1
Master’s Degree in Public Law, Farabi College, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
2
Associate Professor, Department of Public Law, Farabi College, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
3
Master’s Degree in Public Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
10.22034/law.2026.72209.3598
Abstract
Situated within the literature on deliberative democracy, this article analyzes the place and functions of mini-publics as advisory institutions based on random selection in public policymaking processes, with particular emphasis on constitutional drafting and revision. The study aims to clarify the concept and main types of mini-publics, the logic of representation and institutional design underlying them, and to assess their capacity and limits in public decision-making. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, it reconstructs the theoretical foundations of mini-publics and examines their principal variants according to criteria such as selection procedures, issue scope, the binding force of their outputs, and their modes of linkage to representative institutions. It then analyzes several practical experiences, focusing especially on Iceland’s 2010 National Forum in the process of constitutional revision. The findings suggest that, when properly designed and embedded in a broader chain of deliberation and accountability, mini-publics can narrow the gap between citizens and elites, enhance the quality of reasoning and policy documents, and strengthen the legitimacy of constitution-making processes. However, their temporality, limitations of representation, and dependence on the will of elected bodies condition both their normative and practical potential. The article concludes by outlining the implications of mini-publics for rethinking mechanisms of participation and deliberation in contemporary democracies.
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