Approaches of Applying the Principle of Co-Decision-Making in the Prevention of Structural Corruption in Iranian and German Law

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Shiraz University, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Economics, Shiraz University, Iran

10.22034/law.2026.70666.3573

Abstract

Abstract:
This study challenges the prevailing discourse on anti-corruption by providing a theoretical framework and argues that relying solely on transparency is not only an insufficient solution to the structurally entrenched corruption within Iran’s political economy, but in the absence of reform mechanisms, it may also lead to populism or even exacerbate public distrust. To address this strategic gap, the article introduces and localizes a novel concept in the Iranian administrative law and political economy literature, termed the co-decision-making principle. Inspired by the advanced Mitbestimmung model in German law, this principle emphasizes systematic, mandatory participation with voting rights for all stakeholders—including civil society organizations, professional associations, independent monitors, and public sector representatives—in major economic decision-making processes.
Using a comparative-critical approach and analyzing concrete cases such as the “Chay Dabash” and “Bank Ayandeh” files, this study demonstrates that the root causes of grand corruption lie in the monopolization of decision-making within closed circles of power and capital. As a structural solution, a multi-layered and sequential governance model is proposed, in which co-decision-making serves as the foundation for legitimacy and rationality, the obligation to provide reasons functions as a bridge for accountability, and transparency operates as the ultimate tool for social oversight—forming a mutually reinforcing chain. The study’s final innovation lies in presenting concrete operational plans that combine balanced power to translate this theory into institutional engineering. The research concludes that effective anti-corruption efforts require a paradigm shift from information-centered governance to power-distribution governance, with co-decision-making representing the cornerstone of this historic transition.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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