Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1
Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Payam Noor University, Tehran, Iran
2
Instructor, Department of Law, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran
10.22034/law.2026.69483.3544
Abstract
“Judge knowledge” is one of the challenging concepts in the system of proof of claim in Iranian law, which, despite its important position in criminal law and jurisprudential principles, still faces conceptual and functional ambiguities. The present study, using a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing a comparative study of the legal system of the United States of America, examines the origin of this ambiguity and explains the real position of judge knowledge in the trial process. The research findings show that the existing ambiguity mainly arises from two factors: first, the spiritual commonality of the term “judge knowledge” and its use in different meanings such as the judge’s personal knowledge, conscientious persuasion, judicial knowledge and experience, judicial knowledge and certainty derived from evidence and evidence; and second, the lack of explicit regulations about the process and criteria for evaluating evidence in Iranian procedural laws. A review of the relevant provisions, case law, jurisprudential views, and legal theories shows that a significant portion of the existing disputes about the validity of the judge’s knowledge stems from the confusion between the concepts of “evidence of proof” and “evidence evaluation criteria.” Contrary to the appearance of some legal provisions, the judge’s knowledge cannot be analyzed as an independent evidence, but its main function lies in assessing the validity, sufficiency, and significance of the evidence presented by the litigants. A comparative study also shows that in United States law there is a clear distinction between the judge’s personal knowledge, specialized knowledge and judicial experience, judicial notice, and conscientious conviction, and none of them, except in exceptional cases, replace evidence to prove the case. Accordingly, the article concludes that the true position of the judge’s knowledge in the Iranian legal system should be sought in the field of evidence evaluation, and resolving the existing ambiguities requires the formulation of independent regulations on evidence evaluation and legislative redefinition of the concept of the judge's knowledge.
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