From Integrity to Foundational Structure: Dworkin and Rawls’s Justice-Based Approaches to the Constitution in Comparative Public Law

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Law, University of Mazandaran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of International Law, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran

10.22034/law.2025.68181.3508

Abstract

Ronald Dworkin’s and John Rawls’s theories of justice, despite their common grounding in the liberal tradition, provide two distinct accounts of the relationship between morality, law, and the constitution. Dworkin, through his theory of law as integrity, conceives the constitution as a living structure oriented toward the moral principles of justice, human dignity, and equality, to be interpreted in light of the best moral justification of the legal system as a whole. Rawls, by contrast, through his theory of justice as fairness and the notion of the basic structure, emphasizes the role of political institutions in realizing public reason and guaranteeing fundamental liberties in a pluralistic society. This article, adopting an analytical–comparative approach, offers a critical reassessment of the foundational works of both thinkers and examines their convergences and divergences with respect to constitutional interpretation. The findings indicate that, for Dworkin, constitutional interpretation is the continuation of individual moral agency and normative responsibility towards principles of justice, while for Rawls, the rational design of fair institutions constitutes the basis for achieving social justice. This conceptual tension opens new horizons for rethinking the foundations of public law, particularly regarding the legitimacy of public power, moral-oriented constitutional interpretation, and the constitution’s status as an instrument for realizing human dignity. Moreover, by focusing on Iranian constitutional law, the article demonstrates that applying these two theoretical frameworks in the local context can shed light on key issues such as freedom of assembly (Article 27), equality of citizens (Article 20), and supervisory authority of the Guardian Council (Article 99), thereby offering insights for enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of Iran’s constitutional order.

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Main Subjects

References

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Jurisprudence and Islamic Law
Volume 16, Issue 39
September 2025
Pages 197-225

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