Critical Study of Separation of Law and Morality in Hans Kelsen’s Theory of Obligation

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

PhD in Public Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran

Abstract

Kelsen’s effort to deliver a normative positivism (thesis of normativity) leads to a theory of legal obligation which is moral in nature i.e., it provides us with norms which refer to a rational necessitation of an action. But, the purity of the theory demands the separation of morality from law (thesis of separation). Therefore, confliction between the two above mentioned theses is inevitable. Kelsen tries to reconcile them by proposing three solutions: restriction of presupposition of basic norm to effective legal systems, moral relativism, and descriptive nature of legal propositions. These solutions include three claims about the Differentiation of basic norm from moral norms: moral formalism, moral neutralism and exclusion of positive invalidity. But critics argue that the solutions suffer from derivation of “ought” from “is”, rejection of possibility of conflict between moral and legal norms, insufficiency of moral relativism for proving Kelsen’s theory as an only alternative of natural law and traditional positivism and tendency of theory to regarding legal norms as imperative. To avoid these problems, Kelsen substitutes the traditional theory with the empowerment theory. The new one could reconcile the normativity of law with the thesis of separation, but its inability to explanation of legal obligation convinced Kelsen to give up his new-Kantian believes and join to voluntarism.  

Keywords

References

  1. الف) فارسی

    1. مهرآرام، پرهام، «تمایز حقوق از اخلاق در نظریۀ الزام حقوقیِ هانس کلسن»، تأملات فلسفی، ش 26 (1400).

    ب) انگلیسی

    - Books

    1. Kant, Immanuel, The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) (Original work published 1797).
    2. Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre, Erste Auflage, (Tübingen: Verlag Mohr Siebeck, 1934).
    3. Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre, zweite Auflage, (Tübingen: Verlag Mohr Siebeck, 1960).
    4. Schmitt, Carl, Verfassungslehre, (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1928).
    5. Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985) (Original work published 1950).

    - Articles

    1. Alexy, Robert, “Hans Kelsen's Concept of the ‘Ought’”, Jurisprudence, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2013).
    2. Bertea, Stefano, “Law and Obligation: Outlines of a Kantian Argument”, in New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Bertea, G. Pavlakos, eds. (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2012).
    3. Beyleveld, Deryck; Brownsword, Roger, “Methodologica Syncretism in Kelsen`s pure theory of law”, in Normativity and Norms; Critical Perspective on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
    4. Delacroix, Sylvie, “Hart’s and Kelsen’s Concepts of Normativity Contrasted”, Ratio Juris. Vol. 17, No. 4 (2004).
    5. Delacroix, Sylvie, “Schmitt’s Critique of Kelsenian Normativism”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005).
    6. Hart, H. L. A., “Kelsens visited”, in Normativity and Norms; Critical Perspective on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
    7. Hart, H. L. A., “Kelsen`s Doctrine of Unity of Law”, in Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1998).
    8. Honore, Tony, “The Basic Norm of Society”, in Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
    9. Kelsen, Hans, “The Natural-Law Doctrine before the Tribunal of Science”, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1949).
    10. Kelsen, Hans, “Value Judgement in the Science of Law”, Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence, 7, No. 312 (1942).
    11. Kelsen, Hans, “Causality and Imputation”, Ethics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1950).
    12. Kelsen, Hans, “On the Basis of Legal Validity”, translated by Stanley L. Paulson, the American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol 26, Issue 1 (1981) (Original work published 1960).
    13. Nino, Carlos Santiago, “Some Confusion Surroundings Kelsen`s Concept of Validity”, in Normativity and Norms; Critical Perspective on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
    14. Paulson Stanley L., “An Empowerment Theory of Legal Norms”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1988).
    15. Paulson, Stanley L., “The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1992).
    16. Paulson, Stanley L., “Four Phases in Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization Review”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1998.)
    17. Paulson, Stanley L., “Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1999).
    18. Paulson, Stanley L., “Hans Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2001).
    19. Paulson, Stanley L, “Der Normativismus Hans Kelsens”, Juristen Zeitung, 61. , Nr. 11 (2006).
    20. Raz, Joseph, “The Purity of Pure Thesis”, in Normativity and Norms; Critical Perspective on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) (Original work published 1981).
    21. Raz, Joseph, “Kelsens Theory of Basic Norm”, in Normativity and Norms; Critical Perspective on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
    22. Raz, Joseph, “Voluntary Obligation and Normative Powers”, in Normativity and Norms; Critical Perspective on Kelsenian Themes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
    23. Wagrandl, Ulrich, “Kelsen was no Relativist: Reading Hans Kelsen in the Light of Isaiah Berlin's Value Pluralism”, in Die Reine Rechtslehre auf dem Prüfstand/ Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions, Jestaedt, Poscher & Kammerhofer (eds.), Franz Steiner Verlag (2020)
    24. Willaschek, Marcus, “Normativität und Autonomie. Über Verpflichtungen als Handlungsgründe”, Die Welt der Gründe. Proceedings des XXII. Deutschen Kongresses für Philosophie, hg. v. J. Nida-Rümelin und E. Özmen, (Felix Meiner: Verlag Hamburg, 2012).
Jurisprudence and Islamic Law
Volume 13, Issue 27
June 2022
Pages 201-235

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics